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Abstract
We present a model of adaptive economic agents that are k periods
forward looking. Agents in our model are randomly matched to interact
in nitely repeated games. They form beliefs by relying on their past
experience in the same situation (after the same recent history) and then
best respond to these beliefs looking k periods ahead. We establish almost
sure convergence of our stochastic process and characterize absorbing sets.
These can be very di¤erent from the predictions in both the fully rational
model and the adaptive, but myopic case. In particular we nd that
also Non-Nash outcomes can be sustained almost all the time whenever
they are individually rational and satisfy an e¢ ciency condition. We then
characterize stochastically stable states in 22 games and show that under
certain conditions the e¢ cient action in Prisoners Dilemma games and
Coordination games can be singled out as uniquely stochastically stable.
We show that our results are consistent with typical patterns observed
in experiments on nitely repeated Prisoners Dilemma games. Finally,
if populations are composed of some myopic and some forward looking
agents parameter constellations exists such that either might obtain higher
average payo¤s.
Keywords: Game Theory, Learning, Forward-Looking Agents.
JEL-Classication: C70, C73.
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1 Introduction
When trying to understand how economic agents involved in strategic interac-
tions form beliefs and choose actions, traditional Game Theory has ascribed a
large degree of rationality to players. Agents in repeated games are for example
assumed to be able (and willing) to analyze all possible future contingencies
of play and nd equilibria via a process of backward induction or at least act
as if they were doing so. In recent decades this model has been criticized for
ascribing too much rationality to agents. Experimental work has for example
demonstrated that agents do not engage in backwards induction when making
choices in nitely repeated games.1 Consequently some e¤ort has been made
to develop models of learning, in which agents are assumed to adapt their be-
liefs (and thus actions) to experience rather than reasoning strategically. In
these models agents are usually ascribed a substantial degree of myopia or "ir-
rationality", assuming e.g. that players learn through reinforcement, imitation
or at best choose myopic best responses.2 There is vast evidence, though, that
economic agents typically rely on both: adaptation and some degree of forward
looking.3
In this paper we present a learning model exhibiting both these features.
Agents in a large, but nite population are randomly matched to interact in
nitely repeated games. They form beliefs by relying on their past experience
in the same situation (after the same recent history) and then best respond to
these beliefs looking k periods ahead. Beliefs are conditioned on the history of
play which is of length h. This implies that when choosing an action plan agents
take into account how their choice in the current period t alters the history at
t+1 and thus typically the action choices of their opponent in the next k periods.
In general being forward looking implies that two kinds of changes can be
anticipated. On the one hand agents will be aware that their action choice will
a¤ect the history of play (whether relations will "turn sour" or whether they
will improve). On the other hand they might anticipate that future beliefs of
their opponents will change. Our model allows for agents to learn the rst kind
of e¤ect explicitly. The second e¤ect is only present implicitly. The reasons are
that a) forming beliefs about the opponents beliefs implies a kind of strategic
thinking that is absent in our model and b) since the degree of forward looking
k is assumed to be rather small such belief changes will be negligible over the
horizon of the agent.
The stochastic process implied by our learning model can be described by a
nite Markov chain of which we characterize absorbing and stochastically stable
states. The model nests the model of adaptive play by Young (1993).
We nd that absorbing sets are such that either a Nash equilibrium (satisfy-
ing very mild conditions) or an outcome that is individually rational and locally
e¢ cient (but not necessarily Nash) will be induced almost all the time (as the
1See Gueth, Schmittberger and Schwarze (1982) or Binmore et al (2001) among others.
2See e.g. Young (1993), Kandori, Mailath and Rob (1993) or the textbook by Fudenberg
and Levine (1998).
3See e.g. Ehrblatt et al (2008) or Boyd and Richerson (2005) amomg many others.
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length of the interaction grows larger). Outcomes can thus be very di¤erent
from the prediction in both the fully rational and the myopic case. This is all
the more interesting, since in myopic learning models the predictions are usually
very similar to those of the fully rational model. We also establish almost sure
convergence to such pure absorbing sets. We then characterize stochastically
stable states in 22 games and show that under certain conditions the e¢ cient
action in Prisoners Dilemma games and Coordination games can be singled out
as uniquely stochastically stable. Again this contrasts with the results obtained
for adaptive, but myopic agents analyzed by Young (1993). We show that these
results are consistent with typical patterns observed in experiments on repeated
Prisoners Dilemma games, such as e.g. by Andreoni and Miller (1993). We also
show that if populations are composed of some myopic and some forward looking
agents there are parameter constellations such that myopic agents obtain higher
average payo¤ and others such that forward-looking agents obtain higher aver-
age payo¤s in absorbing states. These results suggest that in an evolutionary
model polymorphic populations (composed of both myopic and forward-looking
agents) or populations composed of only forward looking agents might evolve.
There are few other models with limited forward looking agents. Most of
them take a strategic perspective. Jehiel (1995) has proposed an equilibrium
concept for agents making limited horizon forecasts in two-player innite hori-
zon games, in which players move alternately. Under his concept agents form
forecasts about their own and their opponents behavior and act as to maximize
the average payo¤over the length of their forecast. In equilibrium forecasts have
to be correct. In Jehiel (2001) he shows that this equilibrium concept can some-
times single out cooperation in the innitely repeated Prisoners Dilemma as a
unique prediction if players payo¤ assessments are non-deterministic according
to a specic rule. Apart from being strategic another di¤erence between his
and our work is that his concept is only dened for innite horizon alternate
move games whereas our model deals with nitely repeated (simultaneous move)
games. Also Jehiel (1995) shows that the length of memory does not matter for
equilibrium outcomes, whereas in our model it can be crucial, as we will show
below.4
Blume (2004) has proposed an evolutionary model of unlimited forward look-
ing behavior. In his model agents are randomly matched to play a one shot game.
They revise their strategies sporadically taking into account how their action
choice will a¤ect the dynamics of play of the population in the future. He shows
that myopic play arises whenever the future is discounted heavily or whenever
revision opportunities arise su¢ ciently rarely. He also shows that the risk-
dominant action evolves in the unique equilibrium in Coordination games.5 Ule
(2005) has modeled and simulated forward looking players interacting in a Pris-
oners Dilemma through a network. In his model agents realize that changing
their action to cooperation may be benecial in the presence of other agents that
4 In Jehiel (1998) he proposes a learning justication for limited horizon equilibrium.
5See also Fujiwara-Greve and Krabbe-Nielsen (1999) or Selten (1991). The idea of sophis-
tication is also present in e.g. Stahl (1993), who analyzes agents that are n smart according
to the levels of rationalizability.
3
link only with cooperators, hence enabling the spread of cooperation. There is
also some conceptual relation to the literature on long-run and short-run play-
ers (see e.g. Kreps and Wilson, 1982).6 Results more closely related to this
literature have been tested in experiments that investigate strategic sophistica-
tion and the existence of some "teachers" among adaptive players. Examples
are Ehrblatt et al. (2008), Terracol and Vaksman (2008) or Camerer, Ho and
Chong (2002).
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present the model. In
Section 3 we collect our main results. Section 4 discusses extensions and Section
5 concludes. The proofs are relegated to an Appendix.
2 The Model
The Game: There is a large, but nite population of individuals that is par-
titioned into two non-empty classes C1 and C2. At each t = 0; T; 2T; 3T:::; 2n
players are randomly drawn (n from each class) and matched in pairs to in-
teract repeatedly in a (normal form) two-player game. The members of Ci are
candidates to play role i in the game. Each interaction consists of T repetitions
of the stage game.
Each player has a nite set of actions Ai to choose from. The payo¤ that
player i obtains in a given round if she chooses action a and her opponent action
b is given by i(a; b). A history of play for player i of length h < T; denoted
Hij(h);is a vector that summarizes the past action choices in the last h rounds
of the current interaction with player j. In the rst round of each T period
interaction we set Hij(h) = ?. Denote by H(h)  (A1 A2)h the set of all
possible histories of length h.
Learning: Agents in our model are adaptive forming beliefs by relying on
their observations in the past. In this respect our learning model is similar to
much of the literature (see e.g. Young, 1993). An important di¤erence to this
literature is that we do not assume that players are myopic. The myopic case
analyzed by Young (1993) is a special case of our model.
Limited Foresight and Sophistication: Players have limited foresight of
k periods, meaning that they choose actions in order to maximize their expected
utility across the following k rounds.7 They also have limited "sophistication"
of h periods, meaning that they condition their beliefs on histories of length h:
We will assume that h; k < T=2 to enable the process to converge. For most
part of the paper we will assume that all agents in the population display the
same degree of forward-looking k and the same h:We will investigate alternative
assumptions in Section 4.
Beliefs: At each period in time t players form predictions about their oppo-
nents action choices based on their experience with the population and on the
history of play in their current (T period) interaction. More precisely, for each
6See also Fudenberg and Levine (1989) or Watson (1993).
7Whenever there are less than k rounds to play agents simply take into account all remain-
ing rounds.
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history H, agents randomly sample   m out of the last m periods where the
history was H.8 The probability it(bjH) that agent i attaches to her opponent
choosing action b conditional on history H then corresponds to the frequency
with which b was chosen after history H in the agents sample. Denote by it(H)
the beliefs of agent i given history H at time t. Note that if h = 0 then all his-
tories are the same and players just sample  out of the last m periods. Note
also that beliefs are formed relying exclusively on information of past periods.
The e¤ect an agents action choice at time t might have on her opponents belief
at later times will generally be negligible and is not taken into account by the
agent.9
Action Choice: She then chooses an action vector (a )=t;::t+k 1in order
to maximize her payo¤ over the next k rounds, i.e. in order to maximize10
V (it(H); (a )) =
maxft+k 1;[T ]gX
=t
X
b2A
i (bjH 1)i(a ; b), (1)
where [T ] denotes any multiple of T . Expression (1) illustrates how players take
into account the impact their action choice at time t has on their opponents
action choice in the following k   1 periods (by altering the history of play). If
there are less than k periods left to play agents realize this and sum only over
the remaining periods.
State: Denote by Mi(t;H) the action choices in the last m interactions
of player i in which the history was H and let Mi(t) = (M(t;H))H2H and
M(t) = (Mi(t))i2C1[C2 . The state at time t is then given by the tuple
st =: (M(t);H(t)),
i.e. by the collective memory of all agents together with the current history in
all agents interactions.11 Since memory m is nite and all decision rules are
time-independent the process can be described by a stationary Markov chain
on the state space S = (A  H)jHjmH. Furthermore denote by Hs the
history associated with state s and by M(Hs) the memory associated with that
history. Call bs a successor of s 2 S if bs is obtained from s by deleting the
leftmost element from some M(Hs); adding a new element (a; b) to the right of
M(Hs) and updating Hs accordingly. Denote this last element added to bs by
r(bs) = ba;bb.
Techniques: The learning process can be described by a transition matrix
P 2 P where P is dened as follows.
8 If a history occured only m0  m times in the past agents sample minfm0; g periods
from the last m0 periods. If a history never occurred in the past agents use a default belief
having full support on A i.
9 In Section 4 we will discuss this a little more. See also Blume (2004) for an evolutionary
model with (unlimited) forward looking players taking into account these e¤ects.
10We chose not to include an explicit discount factor for notational simplicity. A discount
factor could be easily included in the model, but wouldnt a¤ect any of the results qualitatively.
11 If an agent is currently not interacting with another agents set H(t) = ?.
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Denition (Transition Matrices) Let P be the set of transition matrices P
that satisfy 8s; s0 2 S :
P (s; s0) > 0 ,

s0 is a successor of s and
r(s0) 2 argmax V ((Hs); k);8i
Denition (Absorbing Set) A subset X  S is called absorbing if P (s; s0) =
0;8s 2 X; s0 =2 X.
In Section 3.1 we will characterize absorbing sets. Naturally the question
arises which absorbing sets are more likely to arise if the process is subjected
to (arbitrarily) small perturbations. Let P "(s; s0) denote the transition matrix
associated with the perturbed process in which players choose according to
decision rule (1) with probability 1  " and with probability " choose an action
randomly (with uniform probability) from Ai.
The perturbed Markov process P "(s; s0) is ergodic, i.e. it has a unique sta-
tionary distribution denoted ": This distribution summarizes both the long-run
behavior of the process and the time-average of the sample path independently
of the initial conditions.12 The limit invariant distribution  = lim"!0 " exists
and its support fs 2 Sj lim"!0 "(s) > 0g is a union of some absorbing sets of
the unperturbed process. The limit invariant distribution singles out a stable
prediction of the unperturbed dynamics (" = 0) in the sense that for any " > 0
small enough the play approximates that described by  in the long run. The
states in the support of  are called stochastically stable states.
Denition State s is stochastically stable , (s) > 0:
We will characterize stochastically stable states in Section 3.2.
3 Results
First let us comment on the standard case where (h; k) = (0; 1) and T = 1; i.e.
where each agent plays one round of a normal form game with his opponent
before being rematched. All agents have foresight k = 1; i.e. are myopic and
take into account only their payo¤s in the current period when deciding on an
action. In this case the process corresponds to the process of adaptive play
described by Young (1993). Dene the best reply graph of a game   as follows:
each vertex is a tuple of action choices, and for every two vertices a and b there
is a directed edge a! b if and only if a 6= b and there exists exactly one agent
i such that bi is a best reply to a i.
Denition A game   is acyclic if its best reply graph contains no directed
cycles. It is weakly acyclic if, from any initial vertex a, there exists a
directed path to some vertex a from which there is no exiting edge (a
sink).
12See for example the classical textbook by Karlin and Taylor (1975).
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For each action-tuple, let L(a) be the length of a shortest directed path in
the best reply graph from a to a strict Nash equilibrium, and let L  = maxL(s):
Theorem (Young, 1993) If   is weakly acyclic, (h; k) = (0; 1); and  
m=(L  + 2) then the process converges almost surely to a point where a
strict Nash equilibrium is played at all t.
The theorem by Young (1993) shows that in this special case only strict
Nash equilibria of the normal form game will be observed in the long run. But
note that, unlike in Youngs model, here in general T > 1. Note that Youngs
theorem still applies to this context, as long as agents are myopic and choose
their actions via the process outlined above. One might of course ask, whether
it makes sense to think of myopic learners if T > 1. We do not make such a
claim. The result by Young (1993) can serve as a benchmark, though.
3.1 Absorbing States
We will start by analyzing absorbing states. In our discussion we will focus
exclusively on what we call "pure absorbing states", i.e. states in which one
action prole is played almost all of the time if T ! 1. This should not be
read to imply that we will assume that T is large. In fact a pure absorbing state
can be one in which several di¤erent action proles are chosen. What we require
though is that the fraction of times in which one particular action prole  !a is
chosen is strictly increasing in T while all others are not.
Denition We say a prole  !a  = (a; b) is (pure) absorbing if there exists an
absorbing set X  S in which  !a  is chosen with limit probability one (as
T !1).
If a set X  S induces a pure absorbing prole we will also refer to this set
as being pure absorbing. We now proceed to characterizing such pure absorbing
proles. The rst property we establish is that all absorbing sets are individually
rational in the sense that they guarantee each player at least the (pure strategy)
minmax payo¤ at each t.
Lemma 1 All pure absorbing proles are individually rational.
Proof. Appendix.
This property is not very surprising given that agents in our model choose
k period best responses at each period. The underlying logic is then essentially
the same as in the repeated games literature. Players will only be willing to
choose an action which is not a best-response in the one shot game, because they
believe that doing otherwise will be "punished" by the other players reaction to
such a history in future periods. The worst such threat is the mutual minmax
prole. Since agents look only k periods ahead, every sequence of k periods has
to satisfy this property.
The second property we would like to establish is an e¢ ciency condition. In
fact it is not hard to see that in 2  2 games absorbing proles (unless they
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are Nash equilibria) have to be Pareto e¢ cient. The intuition is again quite
simple. Players will only refrain from choosing a myopic best response if they
believe that the induced history of play will induce the opponent to choose an
action which will yield a lower payo¤ than the absorbing path. But this is only
possible if the non-Nash action is Pareto e¢ cient.
Lemma 2 In any 2 2 game: If an action prole which is not a Nash equilib-
rium is absorbing then it must be Pareto e¢ cient.
Proof. Appendix.
Note that the requirement of pareto-e¢ ciency or Nash is not particularly
strong in 2  2 games. It basically rules out only very unintuitive outcomes.
In games with a unique Nash equilibrium for example (matching pennies) all
outcomes will be Pareto e¢ cient. The following example illustrates why in larger
games this assertion need not be true.
L C R
T 2; 2 0; 4 4; 0
M 4; 0 1; 1 0; 0
B 0; 4 0; 0 3; 3
(2)
Intuitively in this game it seems that the action prole (T;L) can be sustained
in a pure absorbing state in spite of the fact that it is not pareto e¢ cient. This
could be the case for example if players believe that switching to M (C) will
induce the opponent to respond with C (M) while switching to B (R) will not
change the opponents future action choice. Of course there is a sense in which
the prole (T;L) is "locally e¢ cient" in a sense that we will make precise below.
For this we need the following denition.
Denition (Basu and Weibull 1991) A subset of actions A0  (A1  A2)
is called curb whenever it is closed under best replies to all distributions
 2 A0 i;8i = 1; 2.
The denition of a curb set (short for "closed under rational behavior") was
introduced by Basu and Weibull (1991). Essentially a subset of strategies in
a normal form game is curb whenever the best replies to all the probability
mixtures over this set are contained in the set itself. Obviously any game is
a curb-set itself, strict Nash equilibria are (minimal) curb-sets but also the set
A0 = (T;M) (L;C) in the example above is curb.
What we will require for a Non-Nash action prole to be pure absorbing
also in larger games is roughly that it is e¢ cient in a curb set. This is quite
intuitive. Assume that an e¢ cient (non Nash) prole a was played in all rounds
of an interaction 1; ::T   1. Since in round T players will choose myopic best
responses they will typically end up playing a Nash prole in this round. But
this means that given any history of length h beliefs are never guaranteed to
lie on the boundary of the simplex. In fact if  is small enough compared to
m, then conditional on the pure history containing only a all beliefs putting
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positive probability on either a i or the action chosen in the last period T may
be drawn. But then if the set A0 , containing both a and the best response
chosen in T , is curb all action choices following the pure history a will remain
in A0. The necessary condition is then that a is e¢ cient in this set A0 for the
same reasons underlying Lemma 2.
Lemma 3 If an action prole a which is not a Nash equilibrium is pure ab-
sorbing for any value of =m; then there must exist a curb set in which
a is pareto e¢ cient.
Proof. Appendix.
Lemma 3 shows that local e¢ ciency is a necessary condition for an action
prole to be induced in a pure absorbing state. The discussion preceding the
Lemma though suggests that that same condition may not be su¢ cient. The
reason is that if =m is such that beliefs placing too little probability on the
e¢ cient action may be drawn, then choosing the e¢ cient action almost all of
the time will not be absorbing. Since then, there is positive probability for
"bad" beliefs to be drawn repeatedly, there is positive probability that agents
will converge to a Nash equilibrium instead.This will be the case especially if 
is too small.
Consequently such e¢ cient proles cannot be absorbing for any =m (even
though they are e¢ cient in a curb-set). To derive a su¢ cient condition some
restrictions on =m will be needed. But then again - given that we will impose
such restrictions on =m we can relax our condition on curb sets. In fact to
derive necessary and su¢ cient conditions we will use the following denition of
"local e¢ ciency".
Denition We call an action tuple a locally e¢ cient if
1) all unilateral deviations from a strictly hurt at least one player and
2) ais pareto e¢ cient within a (a) curb-set A0  (A1A2); i.e. a set closed
under best replies to all beliefs placing at least probability  on a.
The exact value of () will of course depend on ;m and T as well as the
game payo¤s. Note also that, since all games are curb sets any prole that is
pareto e¢ cient in some game automatically satises Condition 2). The rst
condition 1) ensures that e¢ cient proles are singletons, which is needed to
prevent beliefs from uctuating too much.
Remember also that our denition of pure absorbing does not imply that the
prole in question is chosen at all t. In fact in the last round of each T period
interaction, the e¢ cient prole will never be chosen. What is the case, though in
all such absorbing sets is that the number of times the e¢ cient prole is chosen
is strictly increasing in T . But then, as T ! 1 it will be observed almost all
the time. This is the sense in which these proles are "pure" absorbing.
The next Lemma now shows the su¢ cient condition guaranteeing that non-
Nash proles can be induced in a pure absorbing and the additional qualica-
tions needed.
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Lemma 4 Assume (h; k)  (0; 1): For any game there exists  2 (0; 1) s.t.
if  1

m
T
   then any action prole which is individually rational and
locally e¢ cient is pure absorbing.
Proof. Appendix.
The condition on  1

m
T

ensures that samples remain informative enough,
as outlined already above. Remember that non Nash proles will never be played
all the time since at least in round T one agent will deviate, as in this round
agents choose myopic best responses. As indicated above whenever m is large
relative to T then many "rare" events (whose frequency is not increasing in T )
may be contained in the memory. If  now is too small compared to m then it is
possible that such "rare" events are overrepresented in the sample on the basis
of which agents form beliefs. This can destabilize the e¢ cient absorbing prole.
One role of the size of memory in our model is thus to ensure that samples
remain "informative". Unlike in Jehiel (1995) memory thus can be crucial in
determining absorbing sets of the stochastic process.
Note that the result in Lemma 4 does not depend on there being a discrep-
ancy between Nash and minmax outcomes in the game, nor per se on the time
horizon being su¢ ciently long, nor on there being a multiplicity of Nash equi-
libria in the stage game. Both the result and the underlying intuition are thus
fundamentally di¤erent from the standard repeated game literature. Lemma 4
implies for example that paths involving cooperation in the Prisoners Dilemma
almost all the time are absorbing.
We have seen that proles which are not Nash equilibria can be induced at
an absorbing state, provided they are individually rational and locally e¢ cient.
Next we want to answer the question whether all Nash equilibria can be induced
at an absorbing state. It turns out that this is not the case and that we have
to impose an - albeit very weak - condition on the Nash equilibrium. Consider
the following condition.
Denition (C1) An action prole  !a  satises C1 if 8i and a0i 6= ai : 9a i 2
A i s.t. i(a0i; a i) < 
i( !a ):
Condition 1 is a relatively weak requirement. It only says that - starting
from an action prole  !a  - there should not exist an action that yields always
(weakly) larger payo¤s then i( !a ) irrespective of what the opponent chooses.
Obviously strict Nash equilibria satisfy this requirement. But even Nash equi-
libria in weakly dominated strategies can satisfy this requirement. With this
observation we can state the following Proposition
Proposition 1 Assume (h; k)  (0; 1). A prole is pure absorbing if and
only if it is either (i) a Nash equilibrium satisfying C1 or (ii) individually
rational and locally e¢ cient satisfying the conditions from Lemma 4.
Proof. Appendix.
Proposition 1 shows that both Nash equilibria as well as proles which are
not Nash equilibria can be induced in pure absorbing states provided that they
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are e¢ cient in a sense dened above. An example is cooperation in the Prisoners
dilemma. The intuition simply is that if agents experience "bad" actions by their
opponent with higher probability after a history of Nash play than after a history
of e¢ cient (but possibly non Nash) play and form the corresponding beliefs,
then they will have incentives to refrain from choosing best responses. More
loosely speaking agents will anticipate that taking "aggressive" actions (like e.g.
defection in the Prisoners dilemma) will make relations turn sour, which is why
they refrain from doing so in early rounds of the repeated interaction.
One might ask whether there are other absorbing sets then the pure absorb-
ing sets characterized above or whether cycles are possible. The following result
shows that in acyclic games the process converges with probability one to one
of the pure absorbing sets.
Proposition 2 Assume the game is acyclic. Then there exists 0(h; k) 2 (0; 1)
s.t. whenever (=m) < 0(h; k); the process converges almost surely to a
pure absorbing set.
Proof. Appendix.
The intuition for this convergence result is that the fact that beliefs are
formed by drawing imperfect samples from the past allows for su¢ cient variation
in beliefs to break possible cycles. This is only true for acyclic games, though.
In games with best response cycles, such as e.g. the matching pennies game
convergence to a pure absorbing state cannot be ensured and cycles thus remain
possible.
Proposition 2 establishes that the stochastic process converges with proba-
bility one to a pure absorbing set. A natural question that arises is whether
some of these absorbing sets are more likely to be observed in the long run than
others. The previous results suggest that this might be the case.
As is illustrated e.g. in Lemma 5, the freedom to choose beliefs "o¤ equi-
librium" freely may be crucial for some states being absorbing. For example in
order to sustain defection in the Prisoners Dilemma the "o¤ equilibrium belief"
that the partner in the T-period interaction will cooperate after the history
("cooperate, defect") should not be too high, because else players can induce
joint cooperation by switching once. Depending on the game parameters and
the degree of forward looking this may maximize V (it(H); (a )). This free-
dom to select o¤-equilibrium beliefs freely thus may question the robustness
of the absorbing states. In the next subsection we will perturb the process a
little and study which of the absorbing states survive under these conditions.
More precisely we will check which of the absorbing states are also stochastically
stable.
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3.2 Stochastically Stable States in 2 2 Games
For our analysis of stochastically stable states we will focus for simplicity on
2 2 games. Consider the following payo¤ matrix
z1 z2
z1 ;  0; 
z2 ; 0 ; 
: (3)
If  >  >  > 0 this matrix represents a Prisoners Dilemma. If  >  and
 > 0 it represents a Coordination game. (If in addition  = 0; this is a pure
Coordination game and if  > maxf; g the game is one of Common Interest).
We will focus on the di¤erent cases in turn. We adopt the notational convention
that  !a denotes any action prole as before and  !z j = (zj ; zj); j = 1; 2 is the
prole where action zj was chosen by both agents.
3.2.1 Prisoners Dilemma
Before we start our analysis of stochastically stable states, let us rst describe
the entire set of absorbing states for this game. It is quite obvious that states
involving defection (z2) in all periods can be absorbing (since (z2; z2) is a strict
NE this follows from Proposition 1). The more interesting question, though,
is under which conditions states involving cooperation in some periods can be
absorbing and how such states will look like. Note that, since cooperation is
pareto e¢ cient we know from Lemma 4 that such conditions will exist. Our
rst observation is the following.
Claim 1 The paths of play induced by absorbing sets involving cooperation sat-
isfy non-increasing cooperation (NIC), i.e. they are such that - within any
T period interaction - if ai(t) = z1 then also ai(t  1) = z1.
Proof. Appendix.
The Claim states that the probability to observe cooperation within a given
T period game is non-increasing in t. This is intuitive, since cooperation (being
e¢ cient but dominated in the one shot game) can only be sustained by the belief
of agents that defection by altering the history will lead to a higher probability
of defection by his opponent in the future. For any given degree of forward-
looking k the e¤ect of such a change on total payo¤s will be smaller, the closer
agents are to the end of their interaction T .
Let us now characterize the absorbing sets more directly. The set
X2 = fsj !a 2M(Hs) [Hs )  !a =  !z 2g (4)
is always absorbing. In addition sets
X1 
8><>:s s.t
if  !z2 =2 Hs =) jf
 !z12M(Hs)gj
jf !z22M(Hs)gj 
T k
2 ;
if Hs = ? then  !a 2M(Hs))  !a =  !z 1
and if  !z2 2 Hs then  !a 2M(Hs))  !a =  !z 2
9>=>; (5)
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are absorbing whenever  1

m
T

<   (Condition 2 (C2)).
13 This is a su¢ cient
condition that guarantees thatX1 is non-empty for k > 1, which is also necessary
if k = 2. The condition implies that samples should not be too small (relative
to the length of the memory). If this were the case, then there would always
be positive probability to draw a very arbitrary sample that does not reect
the path of play in any given T period interaction. The size of memory does
thus matter for our results (unlike in Jehiel, 1995), by ensuring that samples
are informative.
The set X1 in (5) is directly characterized through the memory of agents as
follows. Conditional on the empty history memory contains only proles  !z 1;
after a history containing  !z2 the memory contains only  !z2 and conditional on
a history containing only  !z1 the memory contains at least T k2 elements  !z1 .
(Note that as T ! 1), the memory contains innitely more elements  !z1 than !z2). Together with the assumption of best responses and C2 the property of
non-increasing cooperation is implied.
Inspection of the rst row in (5) may suggest that higher values of k lead
to "less" cooperation in absorbing states (once k > 1). This is not quite true,
though. The reason is that with higher k the payo¤ conditions that make a
particular set X1 absorbing become weaker. Note also that the share of
 !z1
entries in M(Hs) is strictly increasing with T . Thus as T ! 1 induced paths
will be almost entirely cooperative. (Note that joint cooperation is e¢ cient and
thus pure absorbing under the conditions of Proposition 1).
Assume now that Condition 2 holds s.t. both sets X1 and X2 are absorbing.
Then we can state the following proposition.
Proposition 3 If (h; k) >> (0; 1); C2 holds and  1 2 (   ; +2++2(+) ], then
all stochastically stable states are contained in X1. Else stochastically
stable states can be contained in either X1 or X2.
Proof. Appendix.
Two conditions are needed for this result. Condition C2 ensures that samples
are "informative" enough s.t. agents beliefs conditional on histories containing
only  !z1 place high enough probability on the opponent choosing cooperation
again. C2 is necessary condition. The condition  1 >

 2 on the other is
su¢ cient to prevent too "easy" transitions from any state in X1 to a state in X2
by ensuring that few trembles to defection are never enough to infect the whole
population.  1  +2++2(+) on the other hand is su¢ cient to enable relatively
more "easy" transitions from any state characterized by defection to a state
characterized by cooperation. A relatively weaker bound on , thus su¢ ces to
enable transitions to cooperative states rather than vice versa. The intuitive
reason is that, since cooperation is e¢ cient, the range of beliefs sustaining co-
operative outcomes is larger than that sustaining outcomes characterized by full
defection.
Note also that the conditions are not tight bounds, since we require in the
proof that the maximal number of trembles needed for transitions from any
13For a proof of why this is the bound see the Appendix.
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state in X1 to a state in X2 requires less transition than the minimal number of
transitions needed from any state in X2 to X1. Since this kind of computation
includes all the states, even those through which no minimal mutation passes,
the bounds are generally not tight (i.e. the interval generally even larger).
3.2.2 Coordination Game
Since in this 2  2 game the only pareto e¢ cient point is a Nash equilibrium
and since both Nash equilibria satisfy C1, the pure absorbing sets are simply
given by
X1 = fsj !a 2M(Hs) [Hs )  !a =  !z 1g
and
X2 = fsj !a 2M(Hs) [Hs )  !a =  !z 2g:
Note that no other set can be absorbing, since if zi is a best response to (bj !zi )
if agents maximize over a horizon corresponding to their degree of forward-
looking k, it is so also for a horizon of any length 1; ::k   1. (Holding xed the
agents beliefs, the longer the horizon over which agents maximize the stronger
are the incentives to forego best responding in the current period in order to
achieve a better outcome in the future). Note also that X1 and X2 are in general
not singleton sets. The reason is that M(Hs) is not uniquely determined for
histories which are "o¤ the equilibrium path", implying that there may be a
di¤erent support for o¤-equilibrium beliefs.
To make the problem more interesting, let us assume that additionally + >
 > ; implying that (z1; z1) is the e¢ cient Nash equilibrium in the one-shot
game and (z2; z2) the risk-dominant equilibrium. The question we then want to
answer is: how does our adaptive learning process select among risk-dominance
and e¢ ciency if agents are forward-looking ? Again Young (1993) has analyzed
this question for 2  2 games in the case where (h; k) = (0; 1) and has found
that risk-dominant equilibria are the only ones that are stochastically stable in
this setting. In the presence of forward looking agents this is in general not the
case as the following result shows.
Proposition 4 There exists b(; ; ) s.t. whenever   b() all stochastically
stable states are contained in X1. Else stochastically stable states can be
contained in either X1 or X2.
Proof. Appendix.
The exact value of b(; ; ) is derived (implicitly) in the proof. The intuition
is again quite simple. In the myopic case a unilateral tremble starting from the
risk dominant equilibrium is not as detrimental (yielding a payo¤ of  > 0)
as a tremble starting from the e¢ cient equilibrium (yielding a payo¤ of zero).
Heuristically speaking then less trembles will typically be needed to reach the
risk-dominant equilibrium than to leave it. This continues to be true in the
forward looking case only if it does not lead to a change in the opponents
behavior. If it is the case, though, that the opponent is likely to react to such a
tremble by changing his action, then trembles starting from the e¢ cient action
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can actually be less detrimental than those starting from the risk dominant
action.
Note that the threshold value b(; ; ) does neither depend on h nor k.
The reason is that the Proposition describes a su¢ cient condition. Even in the
case least favorable to the e¢ cient convention (the case (h; k) = (1; 2)), the
threshold value derived in the Appendix will su¢ ce to single out e¢ cient states
as stochastically stable. The more forward looking agents are the weaker the
conditions on  will be that su¢ ce to get this result.
3.3 Application to Experimental Results
In this subsection we want to illustrate how the results from the previous subsec-
tion (in particular 3.2.1) can provide an alternative explanation for experimental
data from nitely repeated Prisoners dilemma games. An experiment that is
relatively well suited to test our theory was conducted by Andreoni and Miller
(1993).
The treatment that is most closely related to our theoretical set-up is their
"Partner treatment". In this treatment subjects were randomly paired to play a
10-period repeated prisoners dilemma with their partner (T = 10). They were
then randomly rematched with another partner for another 10-period game.
This continued for a total of 20 10-period games, i.e. for a total of 200 rounds
of the prisoners dilemma. Their main results can be summarized as follows.
There is signicantly more cooperation in the rst 5 rounds of each game than
in the last ve rounds. In the last two 10 period interactions the percentage
of cooperation ranges from 60% to 85% until round 6 roughly. Afterwards
cooperation breaks down (to 10%).
The second treatment we are interested in is the treatment they call "Com-
puter50". This treatment coincides with "Partner", except that subjects had a
50% chance of meeting a computer partner in any 10-period game programed
to play the "Tit-for-Tat" strategy. In the language of our model a "Tit-for-Tat"
player is characterized by a level of sophistication h = 1 and always mimics
the action of the opponent in the previous round, i.e. chooses zj at t whenever
a i(t   1) = zj . In this treatment there is still signicantly more cooperation
in the rst 5 rounds of each game than in the last ve rounds. The percentage
of cooperation now ranges between 60% and 70% until round 8 roughly. After-
wards cooperation breaks down (to 10%). In this treatment, thus, cooperation
is sustained two periods longer on average.
The payo¤s in the Prisoners Dilemma in their experiment were given by
z1 z2
z1 7; 7 0; 12
z2 12; 0 4; 4
: (6)
Can we explain their ndings with our model ? First note that our su¢ cient
condition to rule out defection as a stochastically stable state yields  2 (2; 9]
and  1

m
10

< 37 . This is satised e.g. if  = 5 and m = 10. But since we
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do not know  and m, in principle, both sets X1 and X2 as dened in (4) -
(5) might be stochastically stable. Observe also that the experimental evidence
(not only in their experiment) largely satises the property of non-increasing
cooperation rates over time, that we stated in Claim 1 above. We can say
much more, though. Focus on the "Partner"-treatment rst. If we assume for
simplicity that h = 1 for all agents, we can state the following result.14
Claim 2 If (h; k) = (1; 5) the path of play were agents cooperate in the rst six
rounds of all T period interactions and defect afterwards is induced in a
stochastically stable state.
Proof. Appendix.
If m is not too large (in fact m  13), this path of play induces beliefs
(z1j(z1; z1))  5=6 and (z1j(z2; z2)) = 0. Given these beliefs o¤-equilibrium
beliefs have to satisfy (z1j(z2; z1)) 2 [0:42; 0:49] in order for such a path to
be part of a stable state.15 Obviously we do not know what beliefs of the
participants in the experiment were. We can look, though at actual play in the
rst 100 rounds of the experiment. We nd that for the partner-treatment the
probability to observe cooperation (z1) after a round of mutual cooperation is
roughly 0:83 and after a round of mutual defection is roughly 0:1. Given this
we would need (z1j(z2; z1)) 2 [0:32; 0:41] for this to be a stable state. Again
we cant observe beliefs but average play shows roughly 30% cooperation after a
history of oneself defecting and the opponent cooperating. This is at the lower
bound of permissible beliefs. Thus if we think that the actual path of play
is roughly consistent with the beliefs of the agents, our learning process can
provide an explanation for their results.
What happens now if agents know that there is 50% chance of meeting a
tit-for-tat player in each given T period interaction ? Holding xed the degree
of forward looking for all agents, it is intuitive to expect that agents will have
stronger incentives to cooperate in this case. The following Claim conrms this
intuition.
Claim 3 If (h; k) = (1; 5) and if there is a 50% chance of meeting a tit-for tat
(computer) player the path of play were agents cooperate in the rst eight
rounds of all T period interactions and defect afterwards is induced in a
stochastically stable state.
Proof. Appendix.
Note that (h; k) = (1; 5) here obviously is a condition on the human play-
ers only, since the computer players are preprogrammed to tit-for-tat as ex-
plained above. Obviously we would expect more cooperation in the presence
14Of course it is also possible to induce this path with higher values of h; since more
sophistication always allows also for behavior as if h = 1.
15 It has to be optimal for a player to cooperate in rounds 2; :::6; and to defect in rounds
7; ::10 given the induced beliefs. From this set of inequalities the feasible interval can be
calculated. Note also that this interval is much larger if we relax the condition that all agents
should defect in round 7. See also the Appendix.
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of such players and this is indeed what we nd. For the induced beliefs the
following holds. If m  1, on the equilibrium path (z1j(z1; z1))  8=9 and
(z1j(z2; z2)) = 0 have to be satised. Given this, o¤-equilibrium beliefs would
have to satisfy (z1j(z2; z1))  0:12 in order for such a path to be part of a
stable state. In the data we nd indeed that after a history of joint cooperation
the probability that ones opponent will cooperate again is roughly 95%. After
a history of joint defection this probability is roughly 11% and after a history
(z2; z1) this probability is roughly 13%. (Note that this substantially lower value
compared to the rst treatment is due to the presence of the tit-for-tat players
who always defect after observing a defection by the opponent). If the agents
beliefs are only roughly consistent with their experience, then again our learning
process again can explain their results.
4 Extensions
4.1 Heterogenous Agents
A natural question that arises is whether agents with a higher degree of forward-
looking (k) will always be able to exploit others with a lower degree of forward
looking. We will see that this is not always the case. To see this consider the
following example. Assume that there are two types. k1 is a myopic type with
(h; k) = (1; 1) and k2 is forward-looking characterized by (h; k) = (1; 2). Denote
the share of k1 agents by . Irrespective of their type, agents are randomly
matched to play a 4 period repeated Prisoners Dilemma. (Since the game is
symmetric we simply assume that agents are matched randomly within C1[C2.)
The stage game payo¤s are given by (3). We want to consider two di¤erent
scenarios. In the rst agents know that the population is heterogenous and are
able to observe the type of their match at the end of an interaction to store this
information in their memory and thus to form conditional beliefs. In the second
scenario agents are not able to form conditional beliefs. The reason could be
either that they (wrongly) assume that the population is homogenous or that
they are simply never able to observe (or infer) the type of their opponent.
Conditional Beliefs
In this scenario all agents are aware that the population is composed of
two di¤erent types and can react to this knowledge. In particular forward-
looking types can update their priors on the type they are facing (and thus
their conditional beliefs about behavior in future rounds) conditional on the
behavior they observe in earlier rounds.
Claim 4 If  < 3  23   ; then forward looking agents ( k2) obtain higher av-
erage payo¤s in all absorbing states. If  2
h
3  2
3   ;
3  3
3 
i
then
myopic agents ( k1) obtain higher average payo¤s in all absorbing states
and if  > 3  33  all agents obtain the same average payo¤ in all states.
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Proof. Appendix.
The condition  < 3  33   is simply necessary for absorbing states with
cooperation to exist at all. Given that they do exist, forward looking agents
do only make higher prots in expectation if  is not too high. Else myopic
agents do make higher payo¤s in these states. The reason is that when forward-
looking agents decide on their action choice they expect to be able to exploit a
cooperative opponent in the last round of their horizon (t+k 1): But this is not
true in an absorbing state, since other forward looking types do reason in the
same way. Consequently they overestimate the relative benet of cooperation
and choose cooperation in a range of  where they should be choosing defection.
These results have natural implications in terms of evolution. If we assume
that cooperative outcomes have positive probability to be observed, one could
argue that two outcomes could be identied as stable given standard Replicator
Dynamics (possibly with some drift). The state where all agents are forward
looking ( = 0) would be an attractor of such a system, since for  small enough
forward looking agents always make higher prots. The other state that would
be stable is the state where  = 3  33  ; i.e. both myopic and forward looking
agents are present.16
Finally note that if matching were assortative, i.e. if forward looking types
were matched with increased probability with other forward-looking types and
vive versa, forward-looking types will tend to have higher payo¤s on average.
Whether they would always have higher payo¤s will obviously depend on the
degree to which matching is assortative.17
Unconditional Beliefs
Let us focus next on the case where agents are not able to infer the type
of their opponents (or simply assume that the population is homogenous) and
thus form beliefs that are not conditional on the type of their opponent. In
this case the only absorbing state involves full defection, as the following Claim
illustrates.
Claim 5 If beliefs are unconditional all absorbing states involve full defection
and all agents obtain the same payo¤ in expectation.
Proof. Appendix.
The intuition is simply that if forward-looking types are repeatedly matched
with myopic types their beliefs will decrease below the cooperation threshold.
But given this, there is positive probability that even a small number of myopic
types can induce the beliefs of all forward-looking types to decrease. Somewhat
ironically forward-looking types might still have high beliefs about the cooper-
ation probability following a history of joint cooperation (since myopic types
never cooperate). The problem is that their beliefs about initial cooperation
(after the empty history) and about cooperation after unilateral cooperation
16This point would be Lyapunov stable in a model without drift and asymptotically stable
in a model with drift (where drift pushes the dynamics towards the interior of the state space).
17See e.g. Myerson, Pollock and Swinkels (1991) or Mengel (2007,2008).
18
will be too low. The lack of strategic reasoning is in this case responsible for
them not being able to restore cooperative outcomes.
4.2 Node-dependent Beliefs
Note that in our setting agents are generally not aware of (or do not take into
account) which round (decision node) they are currently in.18 They only care
about which history precedes the current node. Conditioning on the decision
node in addition certainly involves much more computational ressources. There
is also a sense in which node dependent beliefs might contradict the very notion
of limited forward looking behavior, since in this case agents memory would
include events categorized according to all nodes and history. It is a little more
di¢ cult to argue then that agents do not foresee future rounds. Still we want to
investigate whether (and which) results would change, if agents formed beliefs
(ajH; ) that depend on the current round of play  = 1; :::T . The following
Proposition summarizes the main di¤erences.
Proposition 5 If agents have node dependent beliefs then the size of memory
m will not a¤ect absorbing states. In 2  2 games outcomes will always
induce Nash equilibria, but in larger games locally e¢ cient outcomes can
also be sustained.
Proof. Appendix.
Remember that the reason why memory a¤ects the set of absorbing states in
the general case, was that too large values of m= tend to make samples unin-
formative, since behavior that is optimal only for some rounds T; T  1; :: might
be dramatically overrepresented in any given sample with positive probability.
This can imply that convergence to some e¢ cient states is not possible. With
node-dependent beliefs this is obviously not the case anymore, since if memory
and thus beliefs are conditioned on the decision nodes then samples will always
be informative of the behavior at that node, unless behavior is random sth we
excluded.
Still though, the Proposition shows that this need not be unambigously
good for e¢ cient outcomes to arise. The reason simply being that if beliefs
are conditioned on the decision node agents at T   1 will eventually learn that
whatever they choose, their opponent will best respond in T: But then for 2 2
games the typical backward induction logic kicks in and we will end up with
Nash behavior at each node. In larger games, though this need not be true, since
agents can still believe that deviating from the e¢ cient action will induce their
opponent to choose a third (and possibly worse) action with high probability.
In these games thus individually rational and locally e¢ cient outcomes can still
be sustained even if they are not Nash. Note again that this is true irrespective
of whether there is a discrepancy between the Nash and the minmax payo¤ and
18An exception is the rst decision node in each T period interaction which is always
preceded by the empty history.
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irrespective of whether the game in question has a unique Nash equilibrium or
not.
Node - indepence of beliefs is thus crucial for some of the results. It certainly
seems to be the right assumption in cases where a) the cognitive cost of having
time-dependent memories and beliefs is too high or b) where the time horizon
T (while nite) is large. If T is small, though, node-dependence might also
constitute a reasonable model.
4.3 Anticipating Belief Changes
One might wonder what would happen if agents anticipated the e¤ect their
action choice at t has on their opponents beliefs in future rounds. Of course
adaptive agents will not take such e¤ects into account explicitly, but what if
they were somewhat more strategic ? Note though, that since we assume that
agents care only about k < T periods, but typically have a relatively large
memory these e¤ects will be negligible. They could become important, though,
if agents had a larger horizon or even unlimited foresight (i.e. k ! 1). To
analyze these e¤ects is beyond the scope of this paper. See Blume (2004) for a
model of unlimited forward looking players focusing on these e¤ects.
5 Conclusions
In this paper we have studied agents interacting in nitely repeated games.
Agents are adaptive learners, but also forward-looking to some degree. We have
shown that in a pure absorbing set either Nash equilibria satisfying a very weak
conditions or individually rational and locally e¢ cient proles can be induced.
In 2 2 there are parameter conditions under which only the e¢ cient outcomes
are induced in stochastically stable states. We have also seen that these results
can provide explanations for common ndings in experiments.
Further research could extend on Section 4.1 and study under which condi-
tions forward looking behavior emerges as a result of evolutionary selection. It
seems also worthwhile to test forward-looking behavior experimentally, since it
seems to provide a very intuitive foundation of many other experimental results.
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A Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. Consider an absorbing action prole ((a; b) )=t m+1;:::t: where the
same actions are chosen at each time t by both players. Focus wlg on player
1. Either a 2 BR(b). But then a must guarantee the maxmin payo¤ b
to player 1: If a =2 BR(b) ^ (a; b) < b then this must be because player
1 believes that a deviation (to say a0) yields a higher payo¤ in the future,
i.e. for some  2 [t + 1; t + minfk; hg] within the same T period interaction:
1()(bj::::(a0; b); ::)1((BR(b); b) < b: But then again at  the same argument
holds, i.e. there must be a  0 2 [ + 1; t + minfk; hg] for which the above in-
equality holds. Applying this argument recursively shows that she can guarantee
herself the maxmin payo¤ at  2 [t+ 1;  + k] and thus at t.
Proof of Lemma 2
Proof. As the prole (a; b) is not a Nash equilibrium, there must exist at
least one player i s.t. (wlg) a =2 BR(b) at some t. This can only be if player i
believes that deviating will reduce her payo¤ in some periods t+1; ::; t+k. But
if (a; b) is not pareto e¢ cient then either (a0; b) or (a0; b0) must yield a higher
payo¤ to both players for some a0; b0 6= a; b.19 Then the previous statement
cannot be true.
Proof of Lemma 3
Proof. We start with condition 2) of local e¢ ciency. First note that as a
is not a Nash equilibrium it cannot be a singleton curb set (and thus Lemma
19 If this is not true for player i it must be true for player  i.
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3 states that it must be pareto e¢ cient in a set of at least cardinality 4.20 If
a is pareto e¢ cient in a set of cardinality  4 then it must be so also in a
set of cardinality 4. But if it is not pareto e¢ cient in a set of cardinality 4 it
cannot be induced by Lemma 2. Now we will show that this set, denote by
A0 has to be (a) curb. If the set A0 = A01  A02 is not curb ) 9;i 2 A0
where ;i(a
)  (a) s.t. BR i(;i) =2 A0. Furthermore as a is not a Nash
equilibrium, some player i must have a better response a"; which will be chosen
in a T-period interaction for some  2 [T    ; T ] after a history (a; :::a). But
then there is strictly positive probability that at some point t player i will hold
a belief ;i 2 A0 where ;i(a)  (a) s.t. BR i(;i) =2 A0.
Proof of Lemma 4
Proof. Denote by  !a  = (a; b) an individually rational and locally e¢ -
cient action prole. We want beliefs to satisfy a) (b; ( !a ; :::; !a )) is s.t.
BRt [(b; ( !a ; :::; !a ))] = a; 8t  T   1 and b) (b; ( !a ; :::; a0)) is such
that BRt [(b; ( !a ; :::; a0))] = a00;8a0; a00 2 A0 where A0 contains a and is
(a) curb: Now consider an absorbing state where all T period interactions
are identical and look as follows, ( !a ; :::; !a | {z }
T 1 Rounds
; !a "). Then (b; ( !a ; :::; !a )) 
1   1 mT  and (b00j( !a ; :::; !a ))   1 mT  since memory of size m permits
to draw at most

m
T

times  !a "in a sample of size . Also (b0j( !a ; :::; !a )) =
0;8b0 6= b; b00. On the other hand default beliefs can be chosen s.t. (b00j( !a ; :::; a0))
> 0) b00 2 A0 i holds. Finally assuming that  1

m
T
   for  small enough
s.t. BR

1   1 mT  = a;8t  T   1 yields the result.
Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. Part (ii) follows directly from Lemma 1-3. For part (i) the proof is
as follows. Consider an state where the NE  !a  is played at each t. We
will rst show that if C1 is satised such a state is absorbing. In order for
such a state to be absorbing beliefs have to satisfy (aj( !a ; :::; !a )) = 1 and
(bj( !a ; :::; (a0i; a i)) is s.t.
t+k 1P
=t
P
b2A 
i (bjH(   1))i(a; b)  k( !a ) < 0.
But beliefs (bj( !a ; :::; (a0i; a i)) that guarantee the previous inequality exist
whenever C1 is satised. Next we prove necessity. Assume C1 is not satised,
in particular assume that there exists a0i s.t. 
i(a0i; a i)  i( !a );8 a i 2 A i.
But then @(bj( !a ; :::; (a0i; a i)) for which player i would strictly prefer to choose
ai rather than a
0
i .
Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. We will show that there exists a number K 2 N and a probability p
s.t. from any s 2 S the probability is at least p to converge within K periods
to a pure absorbing set. K and p are time independent and state independent.
Hence the probability of not reaching a pure absorbing set after at least rK
periods is at most (1  p)r which tends to zero as r !1.
(i) Let st = (M(t);H(t)) be the state in period t  m. Denote a the prole
chosen at t: If H(t + 1) = H(t) = (a; :::a) then we can go to step (ii) of the
proof (setting t =  00). Assume thus H(t+ 1) 6= H(t): Then, since the set of all
20Note that any set of cardinality 2 or 3 containing (a; b) cannot be curb.
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possible histories H is nite, 9 0 > t s.t. H( 0) = H() for some  2 [t;  0   1].
But then there is positive probability that H( 0+1) = H( +1) etc..., i.e. there
is positive probability to return to history H() any nite number of times. At
history H(); there is positive probability, that each agent samples the last 
plays in M(H(t)): Denote this sample by . There is also positive probability
that the next  times that the history is H(t) the agent samples  again and
chooses the same best response.
(ii) Order the histories according to  as follows: H();H(+1); ::H( 0 1).
Now assume there exists H( 00) 2 [H();H( 0   1)] where H( 00) =: (a; ::a)
is part of an absorbing set. Then there is positive probability to sample only
the last  rounds for the next m    periods thereby creating a homogenous
memory M(H( 00)) = (a; ::a). Since ai 2 BR(a i) an absorbing set has been
reached.
(iii) Assume now instead that there does not exist H( 00) 2 [H();H( 0 1)]
with this property. Now for any  00 2 [ ;  0 1] there is positive probability that
each agent samples the last  periods where the history was H( 00); i.e. takes
a homogenous sample (a; :::a). The best response to (a; :::a) for each agent lies
on a directed path leading to an absorbing set since the game is acyclic. Again
now 9 000 >  00 s.t. H( 000) = H( iv) for some  iv 2 [ 00;  000  1], since the set of
all histories is nite. But then again there is positive probability that all agents
take the same sample and choose the same best response to this sample in the
next  periods 8H( iv):::H( 000  1). If there is a history in H( iv):::H( 000  1)
that is part of an absorbing set, then jump to (ii). Else repeat step (iii). Note
next that since the game is acyclic a directed path from any (a; :::a) to a history
(a; ::a) which is part of a pure absorbing set exists. Using the algorithm
above, there is thus a positive probability to reach any history on that path and
eventually a history which is part of an absorbing set. In order for that to be
possible m needs to be small enough, since some agents have to be able to look
back far enough.
To sum up, we have shown that from any state s there is positive probability
ps to converge to a pure absorbing set. By setting p = mins2S ps > 0 it follows
that from any initial state the process converges with at least probability p to
an absorbing set in K periods.
Proof of Absorbing Sets Prisoners Dilemma:
Proof. That the set X2 is absorbing follows directly from Lemma 5. The
proof that X1 is absorbing follows from Lemma 4. It remains to show that the
upper bound on  1

m
T

is given by   . First note that the most restrictive
conditions are encountered in the case k = 2 and h = 1. In this case the
condition is that both players have to nd it advantageous to choose z1 (z1)
after a history of  !a 1.
V (( !a 1); z1) > V (( !a 1); z2), (z1j !a 1) > 

;
where we have set (z1j(z2; z1)) = 0. But then since Ms contains at most

m
T

choices of z2 and  elements from Ms are randomly drawn to form this belief.
The inequality  1

m
T

< 1   =   follows. Also note that there can be no
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other absorbing states not contained in either X1 or X2. Since starting from any
state outside X1 involving some cooperation there is always positive probability
to draw beliefs which will lead to convergence to X2.
Proof of Claim 1
Proof. Assume that at round t (within a given T period interaction) beliefs
of agent i are such that she nds it optimal to choose cooperation (z1). If
dteT   t  k (where dteT denotes the smallest multiple of T larger than t), then
the maximization problem at t   1 is identical to that at t. Now assume that
beliefs at t  1 were such that the agent would nd z2 optimal. But then (since
we are in an absorbing state) it cannot be that beliefs change in such a way that
cooperation is optimal at t. What if dteT  t < k ? Then at t the agent will have
strictly less "foresight" than at t 1. But then defection (z2) will seem relatively
better to cooperation (z2) compared to a situation where the agent expects k
more periods. The reason is that choosing defection must always reduced the
probability with which the opponent is expected to cooperate in the future. (If
this were not the case both agents would defect at all t). But given this again
cooperation must follow at t  1.
s-trees
For most of the following proofs we will rely on the graph-theoretic tech-
niques developed by Freidlin and Wentzell (1984).21 They can be summarized
as follows. For any state s an s tree is a directed network on the set of ab-
sorbing states 
; whose root is s and such that there is a unique directed path
joining any other s0 2 
 to s: For each arrow s0 ! s00 in any given s tree the
costof the arrow is dened as the minimum number of simultaneous trembles
necessary to reach s00 from s0. The cost of the tree is obtained by adding up the
costs of all its arrows and the stochastic potential of a state s is dened as the
minimum cost across all s trees.
Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. (i) Consider rst transitions from X2 ! X1. Denote by kC(1) the mini-
mal number of mistakes necessary in order for one pair of players in a T-period
interaction to start choosing cooperation at each t < T . Note that kC(1) > 1 will
hold for any s 2 X2, since otherwise s couldnt have been absorbing in the rst
place. Now assume that at t player 1 trembles s.t. the action prole is (z1; z2)
and that then at t+1 player 2 trembles s.t. a(t+1) = (z2; z1). Consider choices
at t+ 2. Now player 1 will choose z1 whenever (z1j(z1; z2)) > +2( ) =: b1.
But then since beliefs are formed by drawing randomly  out of the last m
observations, this implies that we need 1  b1 in order to have kC(1) = 2.
Where does b1 = +2( ) come from ? First note that the least favorable
case for such a transition is the case with (h; k) = (1; 2). Then we observe that
V (; (z1; z2)) = (z1j(z1; z2)) [+ ((z1j !z1) + (1  (z1j !z1))] (7)
+(1  (z1j(z1; z2)) [(z1j(z1; z2) + (1  (z1j(z1; z2))] and
V (; (z2; z2)) = (z1j(z1; z2)) [ + (z1j(z2; z1)) + (1  (z1j(z2; z1)))]
+(1  (z1j(z1; z2))) [ + (z1j !z2) + (1  (z1j !z2))] :
21See also Young (1993, 1998).
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We then want to nd conditions on (z1j(z1; z2)) such that V ((); (z1; z2)) >
V ((); (z2; z2)) for all candidate states s 2 X2. Clearly (z1j !z2) = 0 is deter-
mined "on the equilibrium path". By setting (z1j(z2; z1)) = 0 and (z1j !z1) to
either f0; 1g we obtain the threshold above. (We can set (z1j(z2; z1)) = 0 since
the state with the corresponding memory can be reached from any other state
in X2 by a sequence of one-trembles which is not true for the reverse).
Finally note that after two agents have been infected (through kC(1) = 2
trembles) the whole population can be infected. The reason is that whenever
the infected agents are rematched they will start to cooperate after the empty
history since their beliefs (z1j(z2; z1)) are su¢ ciently high and since k > 1.
The history (z2; z1) will be repeated until there are su¢ cient draws for player 1
to optimally choose z1. This is always possible if T is "large enough" and since
 1
 >

  .
(ii) Let us then turn to the reverse transitions X1 ! X2. Again we are
interested rst in the minimal number of mistakes kD(1) needed for a pair of
players to start choosing defection at each t. First assume that two players
simultaneously make a mistake and choose (z2; z2) at some time t. Then it
can be shown by comparing the analogous expressions to (7) that a necessary
condition for either player to choose z2 (z2) also at t+1 is that 2 > . Secondly
assume that player 1 makes two mistakes and chooses z2 at t and t+1. Now we
want to identify a su¢ cient condition for a transition not to be possible, so we
consider the most favorable case for such a transition which is (h; k) = (1; 2).
Next we consider both players decisions at t + 2. We will show that a
necessary condition for player 2 to choose z2 at t+2 is that (z1j(z2; z1)) >   .
To see this compare
V (; (z1; z2)) = (z1j(z2; z1)) [+ (z1; !z1) + (1  (z1; !z1))]
+(1  (z1j(z2; z1)))[(z1j(z2; z1)) + (1  (z1j(z2; z1)))] and
V (; (z2; z2)) = (z1j(z2; z1)) [ + (z1j(z1; z2)) + (1  (z1j(z1; z2)))]
+(1  (z1j(z2; z1)) [(z1; !z2) + (1  (z1; !z2))] :
Then it can be seen that a necesary condition for a transition to be possible
from any state in X1 is that (z1j(z2; z1)) >   . Since  rounds are drawn from
the memory to form this belief we need 1 >

  . By analyzing the analogous
expressions for player 1 it can be shown that a transition cannot be induced by
player 1 repatedly choosing z2 starting at t+ 2.
(iii) Combining the conditions found in (i) ad (ii) we rst note that  1 >

  ) 2 < : Together with 1  +2( ) a su¢ cient condition thus is  1 
maxf   ; +2++2(+)g, the condition in Proposition 3.
(iv) To nish the proof take any state s 2 X2 and consider a minimal s tree.
Assume rst that there exists a state s0 2 X1 s.t. the transition from s0 to s
requiring the least amount of trembles is direct (i.e. does not pass through
another absorbing state). Remember now that s0 ! s requires more trembles
than s ! s0 under our conditions. But then we can simply redirect the arrow
s0 ! s thereby creating an s0 tree with smaller stochastic potential. Finally if
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the shortest transition s0 ! s is indirect (passing through other states in X1)
do the following do the following. Take the arrow s00 ! s leading to s and
reverse it. Since s00 ! s has a cost of at least two under our conditions we
have created an s00 tree with potential  (s00)   (s). If strict inequality holds
the proof is complete. Assume thus  (s00) =  (s). Then consider the arrow
s000 ! s00 and reverse it etc... Now at some point there must exist a state siv
on the path s0 ! s00 s.t. reversing this link saves one "mutation". Else the
s tree could not be minimal. Reversing this link will yield an siv tree with
 (siv) <  (s00)   (s).
Proof of Proposition 4
Proof. We will show that there exists b(; ; ) s.t. whenever   b() a
transition from any state in X1 to some state in X2 involves more simultaneous
mistakes than a transition from any state in X2 to a state in X1. (i) Consider
rst transitions from X1 to X2. Assume that in a given T period interaction
one player makes a mistake and chooses z2 in the rst round. For some states
in X1 (e.g. states where (z1j(z2; z1) = 0) this will be su¢ cient to induce
a pair of agents to end up both choosing z2 in this interaction with positive
probability.22 To induce a transition then one agent from such a pair has to
observe z2 often enough after the empty history in order to start choosing z2
in each new interaction. Comparing expected payo¤s yields (z1j?)  2+ in
the case where (h; k) = (1; 2). For higher (h; k) the conditions will be weaker.
Since we are interested in a su¢ cient condition we focus on (h; k) = (1; 2). But
then since (z1j?)   2 where 2 is the number of mutations, we have that
at least b2() = (2+    )
2+ 

mutations are necessary to induce such a transition. (ii) On the other hand
for the reverse transition from any state in X2 to a state in X1 the following
number of mistakes 1 are su¢ cient. First it can be calculated that the number
of mutations to ensure a pair of agents to converge to choosing z1 from any
state in X2 is bound above by 0 =
l
2
(+3 )
m
:(Again this can be found by
comparing expected payo¤s after assuming that one player of the pair makes 
mistakes in a row). If this is true still one of the two players has to experience
enough trembles after the the empty history in order to start choosing z1 in
each new interaction. If this is true, no additional trembles are needed, since
for this player favorable beliefs have positive probability to be drawn, since she
has already experienced convergence to z1 once. How many additional trembles
are needed can again be calculated comparing expected payo¤s. Beliefs have to
satisfy (z1j?)  2 
 1
(2  1)+  0 1( ) and since (z1j?)   a su¢ cient
22These states may seem inherently unstable, but remember that we only want to nd a
su¢ cient condition.
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condition is
b1() =
2666 2  (2   1)+       l 2(+3 )m  1(   )
3777+

2
(+ 3   )

:
Now, if b1 < b2; then all stochastically stable states are contained in X1. Note
that @b2=@ > @b1=@; 8 and b2(0) = 0. Hence a xed point b() does exist.
This completes the proof.
Proof of Claim 2:
Proof. Assume that (z1j(z1; z1)) = 5=6; (z1j?) = 1 and (z1j(z2; z2)) = 0
and denote o¤-equilibrium beliefs (z1j(z2; z1)) =: x. By Claim 1, if an agent
nds it optimal to cooperate in round 6, she will nd it optimal to cooperate
in round 1,..5. Also if an agent nds it optimal to defect in round 7, she will
nd it optimal to do so in rounds 8,..10. We will thus show that under the
conditions of the Claim all agents will nd it optimal to cooperate in round 6
and to defect in round 7. Denote the vectors (z1; z1; z1; z1; z2) =:
 !a (z1) and
(z2; z2; z2; z2; z2) =:
 !a (z2). To show the rst claim, it is then su¢ cient to
verify that V (it(z1j !z1); !a (z1)) ' 33:73 exceeds V (it(z1j !z1); !a (z2)) = 10:4 +
12
P4
j=1 x
j+4
P4
j=1(1 xj). To show the second claim it is su¢ cient to establish
that V (it(z1j !z1); !a (z1)0) ' 27:9 is smaller than V (it(z1j !z1); !a (z2)0) = 10:4+
12
P3
j=1 x
j + 4
P3
j=1(1   xj) where  !a (z1)0 := (z1; z1; z1; z2) and  !a (z2)0 :=
(z2; z2; z2; z2): Both inequalities are satised whenever x 2 [0:42; 0:49]. Then
whenever m  13 beliefs will always lie in the relevant intervals and thus this
will be absorbing. In fact we have shown that all absorbing states that involve
any cooperation at all are characterized by this pattern. Furthermore we know
by Proposition 3 that at least some cooperative states are stochastically stable,
which then again must be characterized by the pattern above.
Proof of Claim 3:
Proof. Assume that (z1j(z1; z1)) = 7=8; (z1j?) = 1 and (z1j(z2; z2)) =
0 and denote o¤-equilibrium beliefs (z1j(z2; z1)) =: x2 and (z1j(z1; z2)) =
y. (Note that now (z1j(z2; z1)) is denotedx2 ; since with probability 12 the
agent faces a tit-for-tat player. In analogy to the proof of Claim 2, we will
show that under the conditions of the Claim all agents will nd it optimal
to cooperate in round 8 and to defect in round 9. For this we verify that
V (it(z1j !z1); (z1; z1; z2)) ' 21:9 exceeds V (it(z1j !z1); (z2; z2; z2)) ' 16 + 4(x+
x2 + x3);8x 2 [0; 1] and that V (it(z1j !z1); (z1; z2)) ' 17:2 + 23y is smaller than
V (it(z1j !z1); (z2; z2)) ' 17+ 6:6x. Note that y will be at least 12 since a tit-for-
tat player will always respond with cooperation to (z1; z2). But then 8x > 0:12
this inequality is satised. But then whenever m  19 beliefs will always lie in
the relevant intervals. It follows from the same arguments as in the proof of
Claim 2 that such cooperative states are stochastically stable.
Proof of Claim 4
Proof. First note that absorbing states with full defection exist for all .
Obviously in these states all agents will have the same average payo¤s. Fur-
thermore whenever  > 3  33  or whenever 3    < 0, all absorbing states
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will be characterized by full defection. Note also that myopic types will always
choose defection since it is a dominant strategy. If   3  33  types k2 will
nd it always optimal to cooperate after the empty history (given all beliefs
(z1j?; k2) = 1;(z1j !z1 ; k2)  23 ;(z1j?; k1) = (z1j !z1 ; k1) = 0). But then
given that k2 types cooperate in the rst three and defect in the fourth round,
k1 types will make higher expected payo¤s whenever
e(k1)  e(k2),
 + (1  ) + 3  (1  )[3+ ] + 3 ,
  3     2
3      .
Proof of Claim 5
Proof. Note that whenever  > 0 there is positive probability that some k2
agents are matched with only k1 agents for at least m periods. Consequently
their (unconditional) beliefs will converge to (z1j?) = 0 (or at least will fall
below the cooperation threshold) and they will start choosing defection at all
rounds. There is then again positive probability that such "infected" agents will
be matched amongst each other (thereby continuing to defect) and that the k1
types will be matched with the remaining k2 types.
Proof of Proposition 5
Proof. First note that at all (pure) absorbing states the same actions will be
chosen at each given round  . But then - irrespective of m - memories will
be homogenous and beliefs will thus be point-beliefs no matter how large m or
. The second assertion follows simply from a backward-induction argument.
Remember from Lemma 2 that if a Non-Nash outcome is induced in an absorb-
ing state it must be pareto-e¢ cient. Such outcomes can be induced if agents
anticipate a payo¤ loss in the future by choosing the Nash action at t. But since
at time T Nash actions will be chosen irrespective of the history (and agents
have the corresponding round T beliefs), there will be no incentive to choose
the e¢ cient action at T   1 etc..The last assertion follows from the following
argument. Assume that at T   1 agents believe that if they choose the e¢ cient
action at T   1; the Nash action will be chosen at T (with probability one), but
if they do not a third action yielding even worse payo¤s will be chosen. Then
choosing the e¢ cient action at T  1 (and thus at T  2; T  3:::) can be optimal
under certain payo¤ conditions and the corresponding state absorbing.
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